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A long-standing problem in biological and social sciences is to
understand the conditions required for the emergence and main-
tenance of cooperation in evolving populations. For many situa-
tions, kin selection1 is an adequate explanation, although kin-
recognition may still be a problem. Explanations of cooperation
between non-kin include continuing interactions that provide a
shadow of the future (that is, the expectation of an ongoing
relationship) that can sustain reciprocity2±4, possibly supported
by mechanisms to bias interactions such as embedding the agents
in a two-dimensional space4±6 or other context-preserving
networks7. Another explanation, indirect reciprocity8, applies
when benevolence to one agent increases the chance of receiving
help from others. Here we use computer simulations to show that
cooperation can arise when agents donate to others who are
suf®ciently similar to themselves in some arbitrary characteristic.
Such a characteristic, or `tag', can be a marking, display, or other
observable trait. Tag-based donation can lead to the emergence of
cooperation among agents who have only rudimentary ability to
detect environmental signals and, unlike models of direct3,4 or
indirect reciprocity9,10, no memory of past encounters is required.
Tag-based mechanisms may be useful even if an agent is unable to
observe or remember others' actions. To show how tag-based
strategies of helping can lead to the emergence of cooperation, we
use the donor/recipient setting of ref. 10. In this setting agents are
paired at random, and one agent has an opportunity to make a
costly donation to the other. Unlike models of tag-based coopera-
tion using an iterated `prisoner's dilemma' setting11±14, this setting
has no continuing interaction between pairs of agents. In Nowak
and Sigmund's model of `image scoring'10, an agent's decision to
donate (cooperate) is based on whether the potential recipient is
known to be suf®ciently generous to others. In our model, an agent's
decision to donate depends only on arbitrary `tags' associated with
the agents. In particular, when an agent meets another agent, it
decides to help if and only if both tags are suf®ciently similar.
Because agents interact with only a few randomly selected others
from a moderately sized population, there is little chance that a
given pair will meet again. Whether or not an agent donates does
not affect the likelihood of receiving help from others. Thus there is
no reciprocity, either direct or indirect.
In Holland's original formulation12, arbitrary, evolving tags could
facilitate selective interactions, and thereby be helpful for aggrega-
tion and boundary formation. While a tag-matching mechanism
can be arbitrarily complex, we use the simplest mechanism. Each
agent has two traits, a tag t [ 0; 1, and a tolerance threshold
T $ 0. Initially, tags and tolerance levels are assigned to agents at
random, uniformly sampled from 0; 1. (In other experiments, we
started with high, T  0:5, and low, T  0:005, tolerances. Except
for short initial transients, the results were not substantially differ-
ent from those reported here.) In each generation, each agent acts as
a potential donor with P others chosen at random, with replace-
ment. Thus for P  3, each agent has three opportunities to donate,
and on average is chosen three times as a potential recipient.
An agent A donates to a potential recipient B only if B's tag is
suf®ciently similar to A's tag. In particular, A donates only when
B's tag is within A's tolerance threshold, TA, namely when
jtA 2 tBj # TA. Thus an agent with a high T will donate to agents
with a wide range of tags, while an agent with a very small T will
donate only to those whose tags are nearly the same as its own. If A
does donate to B, A pays a cost, c, and B receives a bene®t, b. We note
that even equality of tags does not make two agents more likely to
interact, but if they do interact then one will donate to the other.
After all agents have participated in all pairings in a generation,
agents are reproduced on the basis of their score relative to others.
The least ®t, median ®t, and most ®t agents have respectively 0, 1
and 2 as the expected number of their offspring. This is accom-
plished by comparing each agent with another randomly chosen
agent, and giving an offspring to the one with the higher score.
(Another interpretation of this adaptive process is learning in a ®xed
population. In the learning interpretation, each agent compares
itself to another agent, and adopts the other's tag and tolerance if the
other's score is higher than its own.) Each offspring is subject to
potential mutation which may change the offspring's tag, tolerance
or both. With probability 0.1, the offspring receives a new tag with a
value drawn at random in 0; 1. Also with probability 0.1, the
tolerance is mutated by adding mean 0, standard deviation 0.01
gaussian noise to the old tolerance. If the new T , 0, it is set to 0.
One run of the model consists of 100 agents and 30,000 generations.
Each experimental condition is replicated 30 times.
We ®nd that using the tag-based mechanism and adaptive
processes described above, a population of agents is able rapidly
to establish a substantial degree of cooperation. For example, with
P  3 pairings per agent per generation, and with cost c  0:1 and
bene®t b  1:0, the average donation rate was 73.6%.
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the donation rate over the ®rst
500 generations of a typical run using these parameters. The average
payoff for the population at any time is proportional to the
donation rate because each donation results in one agent gaining
b  1:0 and another agent losing c  0:1, for a net gain to the
population of 0.9. The population starts with tags and tolerances
uniformly distributed, so the initial average tolerance is about 0.5,
and the initial average donation rate is about 67%. Within a few
generations, however, the agents with low tolerances begin to take
over the population as they receive bene®ts from more tolerant
agents, but they bear less of the cost because they donate to fewer
others. By generation 70 in the run shown, the average tolerance is
down to 0.020, and the donation rate is down to 43%. By chance
there are some small groups of agents with similar tags and relatively
low tolerances. As these agents prosper and reproduce, their off-





























Figure 1 Population dynamics for the ®rst 500 generations of a typical run. a, The
donation rate. b, The average tolerance. Occasionally a mutant arises with a tag similar to
most of the others, but with an unusually low tolerance. This mutant scores well by
receiving donations from many, but donating to few. Its offspring quickly become
numerous enough to lower the average donation rate and tolerance of the whole
population. Soon their tag becomes the most common, resulting in a transition to a new
dominant tag cluster. This happened at generation 226 and 356. We note that after these
transitions, the average donation rate returned to its previous high level.
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spring begin to spread through the population. Soon about 75±80%
of the agents have tags that are so similar that they are within each
other's tolerance range. The agents in the resulting `dominant tag
cluster' have an advantage as there are more of them to help each
other. The formation of a dominant tag cluster leads to high
donation rates even when averaged over the whole population.
This establishes the evolution of cooperation without reciprocity.
The dynamics do not end with the establishment of a dominant
cluster of similar agents who help each other. For the agents in the
dominant cluster, there is only a slight selection pressure to lower
their tolerance if there are no agents `nearby', that is, with a similar
tag. The average tolerance can therefore drift upwards owing to
mutation occurring near the ¯oor (base value) imposed by T $ 0.
Once this happens, the members of the dominant cluster are
vulnerable to a relatively intolerant mutant.
The vulnerability of the dominant cluster is realized when a
mutant's tag happens to be within the range of tolerance of the
typical member of the dominant cluster, but the mutant's own
tolerance range is small enough to prevent its donation to members
of the dominant cluster. This fortunate but relatively intolerant
mutant will then tend to score very well by receiving help from most
of those who pair with it, while rarely giving help to others. The
result is that the fortunate mutant has many offspring over the next
few generations, and soon establishes a new cluster of agents with
similar tags and similar (low) tolerances. As the members of this
new dominant cluster do not contribute to the old cluster, the
average donation rate in the population falls markedly (see Fig. 1).
The members of the new cluster donate to each other when they
happen to interact because, except for any further mutation of tags,
they all inherit the same tag. As the new cluster grows to about 75±
80% of the population, the old cluster dies out and the average
donation rate rebounds. The average donation rate recovers quite
quickly. This makes possible the overall donation rate of 73.6% over
the entire set of 30 runs of 30,000 generations each.
We can measure the relatedness of a dominant cluster by the
proportion that has its modal tag. Excluding the transient period of
the ®rst 100 generations, the relatedness of a cluster when it ®rst
becomes dominant averages 79%. Ten periods later the dominant
cluster's relatedness increases to 97% as the members who give to
the modal type without receiving donations from them are elimi-
nated. Thus, by establishing dominant tag clusters, common des-
cent has a strong in¯uence on the maintenance of cooperation.
The new dominant cluster tends to have relatively low tolerance
owing to inheritance from its founder. Over time, the average
tolerance of its members tends to drift upwards. In fact, the average
tolerance of a dominant cluster is much higher at its end (0.027)
than its beginning (0.010). As the tolerance of a new dominant
cluster increases, it becomes vulnerable to yet another relatively
intolerant mutant with a similar tag. The cycle continues inde®-
nitely. This cycle corresponds to the one found in many models of
the iterated `prisoner's dilemma' among conditional cooperators,
unconditional cooperators, and defectors7,13±17. In our model, the
cycle of increasing and decreasing tolerance could re¯ect, for
example, a loss of sensory discrimination in a population when
there is little selection pressure to retain it, followed by a recovery
when a more discriminating individual succeeds.
The success of tag-based donation requires enough pairings per
generation to establish dominant clusters. Table 1 shows the effects
of varying the number of pairings per agent per generation, P, on the
donation rate (the amount of cooperation) and on the population's
average tolerance T. With one or two pairings, the amount of
cooperation is less than 5%. With three pairings, the donation
rate jumps to 74%, and then rises gradually to 79% for ten pairings.
The sharp transition suggests that it may be possible to approximate
these simulation patterns in an analytic model. As agents participate
in more pairings, each one has a better chance of being found by an
agent that will contribute to it, thus increasing the spread of agents
with similar tags in future generations. Higher numbers of pairings
also increases the chances that similar agents will continue to ®nd
agents to donate to, and also to receive donations, ensuring the
formation of a dominant cluster with similar tags.
We note in Table 1 that when there are more than two pairings,
the average level of tolerance increases, but only modestly. Thus
there continues to be a pressure towards donating only to those with
quite similar tags. This pressure is a result of the advantage a
relatively intolerant agent has in a group of more tolerant donors
with more or less similar tags. The intolerant agent gains ®tness
because the tolerant agents donate to it, while it bears little cost
because the smaller range of tag values to which it will donate means
that it will tend to donate to fewer others.
In all these simulations the typical behaviour of the system is
attained within a few hundred generations, and then persists
stochastically over the entire 30,000 generation period history.
That full history is the basis of our reported averages.
The cost/bene®t ratio, c/b, also affects the rate of donation. Table 2
shows how the donation rate and average tolerance are affected by
varying c/b when P is held constant at P  3, and all other
parameters are unchanged. As expected, the donation rate falls
when the relative cost of making donations rises. For costs less than
0.3, the rate of donation is at a high level. Beyond a cost of 0.4, the
donation rate rapidly collapses.
In our model, each agent compares itself to another agent, and
adopts the other's tag and tolerance if the other's score is higher than
its own. Suppose instead that the agent adopts the better agent's tag
and tolerance with probability proportional to how much better the
other agent is. With this method, even one pairing is suf®cient to
achieve a donation rate of 49%, compared to only 2% shown in
Table 1. The donation rate and tolerance still decrease with cost, but
are less sensitive than before to increases in the number of pairings.
Our model of donation based on similarity of tags extends the
insight of Nowak and Sigmund10 by reducing the requirements for
the participating organisms: a potential donor incurs a certain cost
in order to help another individual if and only if their tags are within
the donor's range of tolerance. Tags are initially chosen at random,
as are tolerances, but both are heritable and subject to mutation.
Cooperation based on tag similarity does not require that the agents
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Table 1 Effect of pairings on donation rate










We note that increasing the number of pairings of potential donors and recipients per generation
increases the donation rate. A potential donor agent A in a pair donates to a potential recipient B only
if the distance between the tags of A and B is less than or equal to A's tolerance. Pairings is the
number of times per generation each agent has an opportunity to donate to a randomly
encountered other. The donation rate is the percentage of such encounters in which the choosing
agent cooperates, that is, donates b  1:0 at a cost of c  0:1 to itself. We note that the donation
rate increases markedly between P  2 and P  3, whereas the average tolerance of the
population increases only slightly.
Table 2 Effect of cost of donating on donation rate










We note that increasing the cost of donating relative to the bene®ts conveyed decreases the
donation rate. Here, the number of pairings per agent per generation is held constant at P  3.
When agent A donates to agent B, the recipient gets b  1; the cost/bene®t ratio c/b is altered by
adjusting the cost, c. The donation rate is the percentage of pairings in which an agent cooperates
by making a donation. Average tolerance is calculated over the entire population.
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are able to recognize each other from past interactions. Nor does it
require that one agent can observe and recall how the other agents
behaved with third parties. Therefore cooperation on the basis of
similarity could be widely applicable in situations where repeated
interactions are rare, and reputations are not established. Indeed,
the basis for similarity can be completely arbitrary, such as for
chemical markers or cultural attributes. Cultural artefacts that can
serve as tags include accents, practices or artefacts subject to fashion
such as wearing hats of particular colours18. The basis for similarity
also can be `secret handshakes' or other arbitrary behavioural signals
that individuals can detect19. As an agent does not have to remember
previous interactions with another agent, let alone know anything
about that agent's behaviour with others, an agent only needs very
limited signal-detection capability. Indeed, kin recognition may use
tag-based mechanisms such as the `green beard'1,20±23 and `armpit'
effects24±28. Using tags may also be interpreted as imposing an
abstract topology on the agents in which an agent's `neighbourhood'
is de®ned by its tag and threshold of similarity tolerance14. In
summary, our results show that cooperation can become established
and be sustained even without memory. Not only do the agents not
require continuing interactions, they do not even need to observe
the behaviour of others or receive reports from third parties.
Strategies of donating to others who have suf®ciently similar
heritable tagsÐeven though such tags are initially arbitraryÐcan
establish cooperation without reciprocity. M
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Social life has costs associated with competition for resources
such as food1. Food storing may reduce this competition as the
food can be collected quickly and hidden elsewhere2±4; however, it
is a risky strategy because caches can be pilfered by others5±9.
Scrub jays (Aphelocoma coerulescens) remember `what', `where'
and `when' they cached10±13. Like other corvids6±9,14, they remem-
ber where conspeci®cs have cached, pilfering them when given the
opportunity, but may also adjust their own caching strategies to
minimize potential pilfering. To test this, jays were allowed to
cache either in private (when the other bird's view was obscured)
or while a conspeci®c was watching, and then recover their caches
in private. Here we show that jays with prior experience of
pilfering another bird's caches subsequently re-cached food in
new cache sites during recovery trials, but only when they had
been observed caching. Jays without pilfering experience did not,
even though they had observed other jays caching. Our results
suggest that jays relate information about their previous experi-
ence as a pilferer to the possibility of future stealing by another
bird, and modify their caching strategy accordingly.
In the wild, food-storing corvids return to caches that they had
hidden in the presence of conspeci®cs, and readily re-cache them in
new places when the observers are no longer present (for example
ravens8,9, European jays15, scrub jays; N.S.C., unpublished observa-
tions). We proposed that birds re-cache to minimize potential
pilfering by observers. We therefore predicted that they would be
more likely to re-cache any uneaten food, and speci®cally in new
sites unbeknown to an observer, but only if they had been watched
during the caching trial. To test this hypothesis, scrub jays were
allowed to cache wax worms in a sand-®lled caching tray during two
Table 1 Behaviour of the observer + pilferer birds during observed and in
private caching treatments
Caching treatment Wilcoxon pairs test
Behaviour Observed In private n Z P
.............................................................................................................................................................................
No. cached
Davis 8.19 6 1.55 4.71 6 0.81 7 2.37 ,0.05
Cambridge 10.48 6 3.43 9.10 6 3.05 7 0.51 .0.5
No. recovered
Davis 4.61 6 0.93 3.95 6 0.84 7 0.85 .0.1
Cambridge 5.38 6 1.56 4.19 6 1.10 7 0.08 .0.5
Proportion recovered
Davis 0.71 6 0.06 0.57 6 0.07 7 2.03 ,0.05
Cambridge 0.56 6 0.08 0.70 6 0.09 7 1.69 .0.05
Recovery accuracy*
Davis 2.21 6 0.46 3.21 6 1.01 7 1.15 .0.1
Cambridge 3.07 6 0.92 1.52 6 0.24 7 1.36 .0.1
No. re-cached
Davis 2.19 6 0.68 0.57 6 0.32 7 2.20 ,0.05
Cambridge 2.74 6 1.01 0.36 6 0.19 7 2.20 ,0.05
Proportion re-cached
Davis 0.44 6 0.20 0.06 6 0.03 7 2.20 ,0.05
Cambridge 0.28 6 0.07 0.08 6 0.04 7 2.20 ,0.05
.............................................................................................................................................................................
Treatments consisted of three trials/caching treatment at Davis, followed by three trials/caching
treatment at Cambridge (data are mean 6 s.e.m.). A Wilcoxon matched-pairs test compared the
effect of caching treatment for each of the behaviours listed.
* Number of looks to ®nd ®rst cache.
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